Yes, I will link to this and send to those that should read it but not because it is 'mild criticism' of Dr. Hoffman's assertion we should re-label activities as Cognitive Warfare. His belief we should categorize our traditional information activities (whether new tech or old) is another attempt to build support for the same within the context of our new-ish national security landscape, and who wouldn't want that? Instead, I'll recommend it because you get at the core of what should be important to military audiences (for whom Dr. Hoffman was writing) which is that everything we do conducted by military forces should be executed to bend the will of the enemy to achieve a military objective whether tactical, operational or strategic. I've always thought strategic information activities by the department of war/defense were a distraction when we should have touted the effects we can have at a much smaller scale to achieve military objectives but perhaps that was/is a bit too much to take in our military culture? Yes, Political Warfare is the best way to categorize (if one must) our activities but we can never disconnect it from our need to impose our will and hence lends itself to a Clausewitz context. I have never looked at the older translation of Clausewitz though perhaps it is worth a look to gain a better understanding of what he was seeing through two translations. His observations of Napoleon's forces as they destroyed the Prussians at Auerstadt was the defining moment for his creation of On War so it's worth understanding why. Napoleon understood the flow of information on the battlefield and the shortcomings of the Prussian system of command.
This is one of your best posts in a long time! I love it! I always struggle with definitions in this domain. Where does low intensity conflict fit in this mess?
The term cognitive security also fails, but for different reasons. The main goal of cognitive psychology is simply trying to describe and understand how individuals perceive the world. There are benchmarks and performance standards, but, in general, it's a descriptive science. Biases and deviations are debatable and, at the same time, adaptive. Deducing something as deviant from or consistent with a standard is a grave error. Securing the public from "normative biases" and attempting to push a "normative standard" is in itself an information operation. Attempting to market and sell this to the public is bad business and unnecessarily deceptive when better terminology would suffice.
I'm addressing Rand Waltzman's COGSEC testimony and suggestions here:
The Bolsheviks were eating our lunch with covert influence as soon as they seized power. During, and right after, their coup, they inserted an agent of influence into the fractured American official community in Petrograd.
Alex Gumberg targeted the whole gamut of government and non-government, and semi-official Americans in Petrograd. He fed journalists a pro-Bolshevik experience. He fixed everything for
Raymond Robins, the semi-official American who was the de facto conduit for communications between the Bolsheviks and American government.
Such "cognitive warfare" was in their DNA. They followed that up with the Comintern's genius, Willi Muenzenberg's massive and successful covert influence op against the Normal American culture.
You may have noticed the image I used for the post, or you may not, since it's only visible on this substack's home page. I'll post that image separately later this week. It speaks directly to your point, as does, in effect, my PhD dissertation (the defense isn't until Jan 7... schedules): the Russians internalized political warfare and established schools to further not just the means of waging it, but the incorporation of it into policy. In 1946, Washington—State and Congress, mostly—recognized political warfare was *the* central feature of the cold war being waged by Russia. Starting in 1949, there was an effort to dual-track US policy to continue to address the non-military realities of the cold war. That dual-track was knifed when South Korea was invaded by the North across a division that was a direct result of Moscow's political warfare. That dual-track was buried when Eisenhower made Dulles Secretary of State. Efforts to create a schoolhouse to train US government personnel on Russian and Chinese political warfare methods—not to use these tactics but to understand them to preemptively inhibit their success and better react to them—were blocked by State, CIA, the White House, and the broader community supporting the Maginot Line of military-strength centered diplomacy and deterrence because such efforts were seen as duplicative (it wasn't, but that was the claim to defend turf, in fact, State straight up lied on this front) and a distraction from the comfort of tradition (i.e, diplomacy is something done behind closed doors; this is only for covert and clandestine action). Our policies were based on black-white views because we couldn't and wouldn't understand the political warfare waged in and for contested and even safe spaces. This is an old story, but our histories have focused on the wrong elements of the cold war, which became the Cold War when we accepted Russian claims.
Cool. Looking forward to seeing your dissertation.
I'm working on a biography of Alex Gumberg now. Just spent a week in his papers archive.
Not only did our "intel" (such as it was at the time) bureaucracy in 1917-18 not understand covert influence, but neither was counter-intelligence (such as it was at the time) set up to identify and act against covert influence operators like Gumberg.
Though some individuals--USG and outside--recognized Gumberg for what he was (the Bolsheviks prototype/template for covert influence penetrations), the Bolsheviks, and Gumberg, were so skilled at convert influence, that he penetrated the entire American community in Petrograd 1917-18.
Not only that, but he was tasked by Lenin to return to the USA with the Red Cross delegation, and to make gaining diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik government his operational objective.
Which he did--right up until 1933, when the objective was achieved.
1918-33, Gumberg operated in NYC, DC, and across the country, building a network of American government officials, politicians, journalists, businessmen, academics, socialites.
Gumberg created the discipline of Soviet Studies in the USA, with his deposit of his hand-selected documents from the revolution in the NYC Public Library.
Oh and of course it's by Matt Armstrong hence it is 'self-recommending.'
Yes, I will link to this and send to those that should read it but not because it is 'mild criticism' of Dr. Hoffman's assertion we should re-label activities as Cognitive Warfare. His belief we should categorize our traditional information activities (whether new tech or old) is another attempt to build support for the same within the context of our new-ish national security landscape, and who wouldn't want that? Instead, I'll recommend it because you get at the core of what should be important to military audiences (for whom Dr. Hoffman was writing) which is that everything we do conducted by military forces should be executed to bend the will of the enemy to achieve a military objective whether tactical, operational or strategic. I've always thought strategic information activities by the department of war/defense were a distraction when we should have touted the effects we can have at a much smaller scale to achieve military objectives but perhaps that was/is a bit too much to take in our military culture? Yes, Political Warfare is the best way to categorize (if one must) our activities but we can never disconnect it from our need to impose our will and hence lends itself to a Clausewitz context. I have never looked at the older translation of Clausewitz though perhaps it is worth a look to gain a better understanding of what he was seeing through two translations. His observations of Napoleon's forces as they destroyed the Prussians at Auerstadt was the defining moment for his creation of On War so it's worth understanding why. Napoleon understood the flow of information on the battlefield and the shortcomings of the Prussian system of command.
This is one of your best posts in a long time! I love it! I always struggle with definitions in this domain. Where does low intensity conflict fit in this mess?
The term cognitive security also fails, but for different reasons. The main goal of cognitive psychology is simply trying to describe and understand how individuals perceive the world. There are benchmarks and performance standards, but, in general, it's a descriptive science. Biases and deviations are debatable and, at the same time, adaptive. Deducing something as deviant from or consistent with a standard is a grave error. Securing the public from "normative biases" and attempting to push a "normative standard" is in itself an information operation. Attempting to market and sell this to the public is bad business and unnecessarily deceptive when better terminology would suffice.
I'm addressing Rand Waltzman's COGSEC testimony and suggestions here:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT473/RAND_CT473.pdf
The Bolsheviks were eating our lunch with covert influence as soon as they seized power. During, and right after, their coup, they inserted an agent of influence into the fractured American official community in Petrograd.
Alex Gumberg targeted the whole gamut of government and non-government, and semi-official Americans in Petrograd. He fed journalists a pro-Bolshevik experience. He fixed everything for
Raymond Robins, the semi-official American who was the de facto conduit for communications between the Bolsheviks and American government.
For details see here:
https://kentclizbe.substack.com/p/raymond-robins-first-influence-agent?utm_source=publication-search
Such "cognitive warfare" was in their DNA. They followed that up with the Comintern's genius, Willi Muenzenberg's massive and successful covert influence op against the Normal American culture.
Details here:
https://kentclizbe.substack.com/p/origins-of-todays-normal-hating-lying?utm_source=publication-search
You may have noticed the image I used for the post, or you may not, since it's only visible on this substack's home page. I'll post that image separately later this week. It speaks directly to your point, as does, in effect, my PhD dissertation (the defense isn't until Jan 7... schedules): the Russians internalized political warfare and established schools to further not just the means of waging it, but the incorporation of it into policy. In 1946, Washington—State and Congress, mostly—recognized political warfare was *the* central feature of the cold war being waged by Russia. Starting in 1949, there was an effort to dual-track US policy to continue to address the non-military realities of the cold war. That dual-track was knifed when South Korea was invaded by the North across a division that was a direct result of Moscow's political warfare. That dual-track was buried when Eisenhower made Dulles Secretary of State. Efforts to create a schoolhouse to train US government personnel on Russian and Chinese political warfare methods—not to use these tactics but to understand them to preemptively inhibit their success and better react to them—were blocked by State, CIA, the White House, and the broader community supporting the Maginot Line of military-strength centered diplomacy and deterrence because such efforts were seen as duplicative (it wasn't, but that was the claim to defend turf, in fact, State straight up lied on this front) and a distraction from the comfort of tradition (i.e, diplomacy is something done behind closed doors; this is only for covert and clandestine action). Our policies were based on black-white views because we couldn't and wouldn't understand the political warfare waged in and for contested and even safe spaces. This is an old story, but our histories have focused on the wrong elements of the cold war, which became the Cold War when we accepted Russian claims.
Cool. Looking forward to seeing your dissertation.
I'm working on a biography of Alex Gumberg now. Just spent a week in his papers archive.
Not only did our "intel" (such as it was at the time) bureaucracy in 1917-18 not understand covert influence, but neither was counter-intelligence (such as it was at the time) set up to identify and act against covert influence operators like Gumberg.
Though some individuals--USG and outside--recognized Gumberg for what he was (the Bolsheviks prototype/template for covert influence penetrations), the Bolsheviks, and Gumberg, were so skilled at convert influence, that he penetrated the entire American community in Petrograd 1917-18.
Not only that, but he was tasked by Lenin to return to the USA with the Red Cross delegation, and to make gaining diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik government his operational objective.
Which he did--right up until 1933, when the objective was achieved.
1918-33, Gumberg operated in NYC, DC, and across the country, building a network of American government officials, politicians, journalists, businessmen, academics, socialites.
Gumberg created the discipline of Soviet Studies in the USA, with his deposit of his hand-selected documents from the revolution in the NYC Public Library.
All while hiding in plain sight.