The Schrödinger's cat of public diplomacy
Remembering the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs actually exists... or does it?
Since 2011, I have been tracking the ridiculously short tenures of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The average tenure of this high-level and allegedly important official is 517 days, with a median tenure of 477 days. I also tracked how often the office was empty, or more specifically, “unencumbered” with a person confirmed to the position to exclude the numerous acting officials (leaving aside whether any incumbents were acting is an offline discussion). Understandably, a position like this is stressful with some churn, but if you expected such a senior position to be filled quickly, you would be sorely disappointed. Through to the end of the Obama administration (to exclude the Trump and Biden administrations), the average number of days between the last day of one incumbent and the first day of the replacement was 219 days, with a median gap of 239 days. Today marks 600 (!) days the office has been vacant during the Biden administration. Without so much of a nomination to the office, the virtual dismantling of the position’s responsibilities, does the position exist or doesn’t it?
Returning to the churn for a moment, in December 2011, when I was the executive director of the currently virtually defunct-and-failing-to-provide-any-timely-or-meaningful-advice-or-oversight Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy, my staff and I first looked at the turnover of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. At the time, there had been six confirmations to this office since 1999, when the office was established. During that same time, there were five Under Secretaries for Political Affairs, giving us a fair point of comparison. In what can only be a reflection in the relative priority of the two positions, the political affairs office lacked a confirmed appointment only 5% across the twelve years, while the public diplomacy chief was empty 30% of the time. Today, when adding the Trump and Biden administrations, the public diplomacy position has been vacant 44.3% over the past 23 years it has existed. When a position is vacant for nearly two weeks of every month, that each new incumbent raises new questions about how they will define the office and its mission, and most of the office’s authorities have been diluted or replaced, does the position still exist?
With a recurring feeling of being in the movie Groundhog Day, this is a topic I’ve written on often, including in January 2012 and again in June 2021 to remind people this office was empty. (Might the advisory commission, whose three remaining commissioners have each been in their positions for more than 11 years, a length of time to make them potentially well-qualified and sought-out subject matter experts, might have some kind of thoughtful advice on this subject?)
Below is the incumbency chart I’ve maintained for the past 11 years as of today, 12 September 2022:
There is another measure of the relative importance of a position: how soon it is filled. This is not an absolute, but it is suggestive. In the Bush Administration, 254 days passed before the first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was confirmed. To be fair, the appointment lingered for months until 9/11 caused a sudden interest to fill the appointment. The Bush administration would see four appointments to this office during its eight years, with an overall vacancy rate of 37%. In the Obama Administration, the first confirmed appointment happened 124 days in. During Obama’s eight years, there were three public diplomacy chiefs, with an overall vacancy rate of 22%. Distorting things is the Trump Administration, which did appoint an Under Secretary 316 days in, though he only lasted 100 days, resulting in a 93% vacancy rate for that administration. This appointment was arguably not about public diplomacy but to fill a corporate communications role, which substantively was similar to why the first Bush appointee was selected.
The Biden Administration has yet to nominate an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Though considering the consolidation of the (absent) under secretary’s operational elements of the Bureau of International Information Programs and the Bureau of Public Affairs to create the Bureau of Global Public Affairs, I'm personally at a loss to understand what substantive role the Under Secretary would have should one get appointed. I used to write the “and Public Affairs” part of the under secretary’s title in italics to reflect the reality the under secretary had no real leadership over the bureau of public affairs, a situation that seems to have come full circle with Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, now “of Global Public Affairs,” virtually swelling swallowing its boss. The other operational entity of this under secretary, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, effectively declared “you’re not the boss of me” to the under secretary during the Obama administration, which is just another humorous and sad reflection of the state of affairs of public diplomacy at the State Department.
I heard a rumor last year that a nomination would “soon” be announced. Besides the reality no nomination has been announced to date, I’m not sure who would want this job. Surely any such candidate would make significant demands on promises of support and clarity on roles and responsibilities from above (i.e., the Secretary of State and the President) and laterally (i.e., other under secretaries at the department) to learn from the shortcomings and handicapping of past incumbents.
One could argue this office is no longer necessary, or that it does not even exist anymore. I have not seen one discussion around the need to continue or discontinue this office, substantive or otherwise. One would think the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, whose very job is to provide oversight and advocacy over “public diplomacy” might opine on this topic. It might at least raise a flag of concern or a nod of support, but as far as I have seen, they have nearly assiduously avoided this glaringly obvious situation. It is important that in the “bring back USIA!” genre that pretends a new organizational structure will cure all that ails, plus the latest spat of “we need to better react to foreign malign influence operations,” not a single article ever mentions this position. Does this office even exist anymore?
P.S.
If you haven’t, be sure to read this article by my friend Chris Paul and me on why the USIA is not the right example if you want to draw from history for an organizational model to move forward. I discussed that article in a previous substack post here.