I suppose I know too much as I managed the flow of information from the combatant commands to the OSD staff and the Hill.....so I'll leave all that for another time. Instead, let's focus on the quality of the communication written for Iraqis on MG Hammond's behalf. Of course, it was the same people lambasted for their 'propaganda' efforts on behalf of the command and the USG and while I don't know who, specifically, the author might have been of that communique, I'm willing to bet it wasn't anyone on the embassy or State Dept's staff. Why bring this up? After all these years, it remains largely the same people who criticize military communications (SC, IO, PSYOP, MISO, whatever) who remain woefully (intentionally?) ignorant of the enormous shortfall in USG Public Diplomacy resourcing, authorities, and efforts.
Absolutely agree with your assessment. To back that up, my recollection is the author of the statement was an Iraqi-born soldier working for or near Hammond in or near PA. I want to say he was a US Army soldier rather than an interpreter, but my memory is fuzzy on that. That detail is probably in a notebook somewhere. Regardless of the specific, the author was not near the Embassy. This was done "in-house," so to speak.
Relatedly, you remind me of a situation I observed in Kabul in 2011. In a meeting at Camp Emerald, I was briefed on the PSYOP efforts. Previously, in the ISAF compound, a guy named McMaster briefed me on other informational activities. But at Emerald, they told me about some of the PSYOP activities and the staffing. I remarked that the PSYOPers I met at the Embassy were eager but young, like closer to 20 than 25. The response: the Embassy wasn't using the MIST, so MISOTF swapped bodies to give the young'uns experience. Also at the Embassy, recall the PAO was subordinate to the 3161 "super PAO". This step reinforced the department's lack of regard for staff.
I suppose I know too much as I managed the flow of information from the combatant commands to the OSD staff and the Hill.....so I'll leave all that for another time. Instead, let's focus on the quality of the communication written for Iraqis on MG Hammond's behalf. Of course, it was the same people lambasted for their 'propaganda' efforts on behalf of the command and the USG and while I don't know who, specifically, the author might have been of that communique, I'm willing to bet it wasn't anyone on the embassy or State Dept's staff. Why bring this up? After all these years, it remains largely the same people who criticize military communications (SC, IO, PSYOP, MISO, whatever) who remain woefully (intentionally?) ignorant of the enormous shortfall in USG Public Diplomacy resourcing, authorities, and efforts.
Absolutely agree with your assessment. To back that up, my recollection is the author of the statement was an Iraqi-born soldier working for or near Hammond in or near PA. I want to say he was a US Army soldier rather than an interpreter, but my memory is fuzzy on that. That detail is probably in a notebook somewhere. Regardless of the specific, the author was not near the Embassy. This was done "in-house," so to speak.
Relatedly, you remind me of a situation I observed in Kabul in 2011. In a meeting at Camp Emerald, I was briefed on the PSYOP efforts. Previously, in the ISAF compound, a guy named McMaster briefed me on other informational activities. But at Emerald, they told me about some of the PSYOP activities and the staffing. I remarked that the PSYOPers I met at the Embassy were eager but young, like closer to 20 than 25. The response: the Embassy wasn't using the MIST, so MISOTF swapped bodies to give the young'uns experience. Also at the Embassy, recall the PAO was subordinate to the 3161 "super PAO". This step reinforced the department's lack of regard for staff.
Useful piece.