A colleague recently referred me to the following passage in the recent Commission on the National Defense Strategy report and asked, “What would you do?”:
It is quite educational reading these posts (& comments) by those apparently involved with USA/NATO/"Western" Information Operations [IO]. You all are tasked with putting lipstick on something presently perceived by much of the world as a lot larger, more prolific, lethal and uglier than a herd of feral pigs?
Take about three steps back from these image problems and look for the root cause? And consider if you are even working in a place capable of doing something about that issue.
Perhaps efforts should be at the POLICY level to direct our substantial means towards ends such that clearly, truthfully and "spin-lessly" explaining our national interest & foreign policy objectives (and the means we use to try & attain those) would make them appealing to both our own people and others around the world, rather than pour your talents into trying to dissemble about our actual goals & methods more effectively? "Spreading democracy" is not going continue to be an effective PR department description of "securing the realm" by trying to suborn, control or destroy every other country on earth after those so targeted observe & discuss our activities. Perhaps we might consider choosing different tactics if security be our desired outcome?
Have you considered running for national offices or becoming CEOs of large financial institutions. It could be more effective than trying to deodorize a cesspool with a computer keyboard.
We might ask why, for over a century, US leadership from the President on down has not prioritised global communication. Perhaps it's a feature, not a bug, that this period (from roughly 1918 to present, given your note below) occurs during the so-called 'American Century.' Put simply, we don't care about communication because we don't think we have to. Until that fundamental belief changes, nothing else will change in the world of US global public diplomacy. Britain lost its empire nearly a century ago and is still working through the implications. We'll get there eventually, too...long after the end of empire.
It's a good question and your answer is partly true. Before World War I, the US was largely isolated and not deeply engaged. One of my favorite anecdotes related to that was US diplomats in Berlin, before the entry of the US in the war, had to wear US flag pins because otherwise they were assumed to be British. There was not enough knowledge to distinguish between the two. This isolation was the main reason the CPI's foreign section, and its United States Information Service, was launched. In 1919, there was more need for that outreach. This wasn't the US and what it did and why was self-evident. It was largely because it wasn't deemed necessary. Private enterprise could well handle that task if it was necessary. This was carried over into exchanges, which were rightly seen as influence ops, and they were primarily handled by private organizations.
The real lesson of information flows immediately before and during World War II (use "propaganda". here if you want) was that if you don't tell your story, someone else will, and they may not have your interests at heart. Resistence to the US government's post-war international information program included assertions that to discuss the US is to "sell" the US, and that would cheapen us. Another line was who we were and what we were about was self-evident. (Side note: the US aggressively supported UNESCO as an antidote to Russian subversion. That support led to other lines of resistence: if UNESCO and other UN elements are doing this, why should we?)
The feature, as you put it, came into full force after the Soviet Union collapsed. It led to the view that USIA was only necessary because of the Soviets and since the Soviets were gone, the self-evidentiary nature of the US would handle whatever (plus whatever remnant of an international information program that remained). I'm simplifying, but that was the fundamental point.
I feel an “IO Range” like concept, which existed in DOD (don’t if it still does, or that is as relevant as the name suggests), is too advanced for State at this point. Staff levels would limit gaming opportunities. While Defence has enough personnel for training float, State barely gets by, not to mention that training isn’t rewarded in career paths at State while it’s mandatory at Defense.
That’s said, it’s an idea worth exploring. It does remind me of a quote akin to the “strategic corporal” from…1951:
“Sometimes policy is ‘made’ by the junior officer who writes an original memorandum. Sometimes it is made by an unexpected utterance at a top-level press conference. But the information consequences of policy ought always be taken into account, and the information man ought always to be consulted.”
Someday I'd like to learn more about why DOS doesn't like training the way DOD does. I have a private opinion that DOD may love the credentials too much but State seems passively hostile to the notion.
Simples! State doesn't train like the DOD because they have a small fraction of the budget and personnel. We 'Mercans put our money in things we trust. Guns. I say this as a former Strategic Communications Officer because it's true, not because I like it.
Maggie is right. The training float — the excess staffing that allows people to be "pulled off the line" to train — doesn't exist at State. However, it's not just State's efforts, particularly informational efforts, aren't tangible like a tank, ship, or bomb. I've been in the discussions "but Defense builds systems in all states cuz... and that buys them more support" etc. Except DOS activities touch more states and localities, mostly exchanges but also trade and more. This is an especially important point at a time when fewer Americans actually know someone who has served. But, State's domestic outreach is inhibited by institutional practices of the last several decades. Go back to the 1950s, for example, and there was signficant domestic engagement, from in-person to over the air.
We can blame Congress, and not just because weapons systems are built inefficiently to buy votes. There's the argument that armed services committee members get more bang for their buck: they get to ride helicopters, go on ships, fly to cool places, see things explode, etc. The budget for a combatant commander to support a CODEL is a bit more than an ambassador or a regional bureau assistant secretary. The foreign affairs committee, namely in the House, does not have the same prestige as the armed services committee. Going back to 1946, for example, and the Rules Committee Chair said he didn't care if a the foreign affairs committee approved a bill, "it is a backwater" and he'd move on it when he and his committee wanted to. When I testified before HFAC, most of the Members' comments were directed at agencies other than State, mostly Defense, which I pointed out in my closing (which may not have been appreciated). For my part, I've testified several times before HASC, and only once before HFAC, each time on generally the same topic. One is more interested in the conversation than the other. At least SFRC confirms nominees.
We can also blame State. They rarely ask for money for staff. To be truthful, we need to bring OMB and the White House into this part of the conversation to know how often and how much the State Department wanted but the WH/OMB blocked. What we can see is HR at State disliked the bulge from Clinton's massive hiring and did what it could to trim back down rather than adapt. That process, from what I had been told over many years, was on State, not the WH/OMB.
We can also blame State for its relationship with Congress. In 2011, as the executive director of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, I compared the Congressional engagement between State and Defense with Congress. Walking down the hallway with the DOD offices and one say the double doors to the office open and a collegial inviting atmosphere nearly drawing you in. When I got to the State office, the single door was open, but inside was a dimly look maze of 6' cubicle walls in dark blue with dark blue walls. (Whether the room was actually dimly lit or not is arguable, but the dark colors sure made it feel that way.) There was no receptionist and the open cubicle that opened to the door, presumably the person tasked as a greeter, was clearly on a personal call. She continued as as I stood there waiting for her to finish. After finally getting off, I asked who was in charge. They weren't there. Could you give them my card. Sure. And I left and never heard a word. At the time, I was often told by many in the department and on the Hill that my relations with Members and staff was more extensive than the institution's. Whether true or not, there's no way that would have been uttered if the conversation was about Defense and not State.
Lastly, more than one Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has asked for more money for State. SecDef Gates is known for doing the same. One CJCS, before he took the Chief role and when he was the Chief of Naval Operations, even offered some of his budget to State.
There is fault to go around.
On the staffing levels, this doesn't just manifest as a lack of training opportunities and the failure to encourage training (as an institution, individuals may have different experiences if at the right place at the right time working for the right person). It means less interagency integration. I'd have to look back at my notes, but I think it was at the Command and General Staff College at Ft Leavenworth where they had two billets open for State Department personnel. These billets were two-way: the college would back-fill the State personnel with Army officers at no cost to State (I think CGCS was even going to reimburse State for the personnel coming to them on TDY). They couldn't fill the billets. Another example was a large strategic communication conference filled with personnel across DOD and across the interagency. The lone State Department rep there, as I pointed out from the podium during my presentation that touched on this, was a Lt Col. (Later in the conference, held in San Antonio, a subordinate of the Under Secretary for PD/PA came for a half-day and left.) At another conference, this one at SPAWAR in San Diego, I pointed out during Q&A after my presentation that the lone State Department person in the room was there because they were detailed to Air University, and it was Air U that permitted her to attend this week-long event, not State.
There are knock-on effects that I don't see getting much air. Some of this I reviewed with the manager of the last State Department QDDR. He was well-aware of the issues and had far greater depth of knowledge. The final QDDR had nothing about this, which I figure meant it was watered down and removed because that manager, now a sitting Member of Congress, truly got it.
The talk about a Goldwater-Nichols for State is long gone, at least I don't hear about that anymore. There are no champions for State on the Hill with the heft or will to psuh for the necessary changes from their side.
Things will happen when the top leadership decide they want change.
Another Illuminating post! Lately I’ve wondered whether wargaming could be used to analyze narrative warfare matters. Efforts are lacking in trying to develop methods and scenarios for gaming story-wars.
I see that a Robert Domaingue, right after retiring from the U.S. State Department, where he’d been the lead Conflict Game Designer in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, called on State to create its own Office of Diplomatic Gaming, in article titled article on “Why the State Department Needs an Office of Diplomatic Gaming” (2022). It verges on calling for story-war gaming.
I’ve also found that the UK’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) has issued an Influence Wargaming Handbook (2023) — the first of its kind. The handbook claims that “wargaming is particularly suited to exploring and representing influence” (p. vi) — but it is sensibly cautious about the conceptual and methodological challenges that lie ahead for wargaming influence.
Wargaming might be a good path to go down in order to call for improved attention to information etc. matters that keep being neglected.
It is quite educational reading these posts (& comments) by those apparently involved with USA/NATO/"Western" Information Operations [IO]. You all are tasked with putting lipstick on something presently perceived by much of the world as a lot larger, more prolific, lethal and uglier than a herd of feral pigs?
Take about three steps back from these image problems and look for the root cause? And consider if you are even working in a place capable of doing something about that issue.
Perhaps efforts should be at the POLICY level to direct our substantial means towards ends such that clearly, truthfully and "spin-lessly" explaining our national interest & foreign policy objectives (and the means we use to try & attain those) would make them appealing to both our own people and others around the world, rather than pour your talents into trying to dissemble about our actual goals & methods more effectively? "Spreading democracy" is not going continue to be an effective PR department description of "securing the realm" by trying to suborn, control or destroy every other country on earth after those so targeted observe & discuss our activities. Perhaps we might consider choosing different tactics if security be our desired outcome?
Have you considered running for national offices or becoming CEOs of large financial institutions. It could be more effective than trying to deodorize a cesspool with a computer keyboard.
We might ask why, for over a century, US leadership from the President on down has not prioritised global communication. Perhaps it's a feature, not a bug, that this period (from roughly 1918 to present, given your note below) occurs during the so-called 'American Century.' Put simply, we don't care about communication because we don't think we have to. Until that fundamental belief changes, nothing else will change in the world of US global public diplomacy. Britain lost its empire nearly a century ago and is still working through the implications. We'll get there eventually, too...long after the end of empire.
It's a good question and your answer is partly true. Before World War I, the US was largely isolated and not deeply engaged. One of my favorite anecdotes related to that was US diplomats in Berlin, before the entry of the US in the war, had to wear US flag pins because otherwise they were assumed to be British. There was not enough knowledge to distinguish between the two. This isolation was the main reason the CPI's foreign section, and its United States Information Service, was launched. In 1919, there was more need for that outreach. This wasn't the US and what it did and why was self-evident. It was largely because it wasn't deemed necessary. Private enterprise could well handle that task if it was necessary. This was carried over into exchanges, which were rightly seen as influence ops, and they were primarily handled by private organizations.
The real lesson of information flows immediately before and during World War II (use "propaganda". here if you want) was that if you don't tell your story, someone else will, and they may not have your interests at heart. Resistence to the US government's post-war international information program included assertions that to discuss the US is to "sell" the US, and that would cheapen us. Another line was who we were and what we were about was self-evident. (Side note: the US aggressively supported UNESCO as an antidote to Russian subversion. That support led to other lines of resistence: if UNESCO and other UN elements are doing this, why should we?)
The feature, as you put it, came into full force after the Soviet Union collapsed. It led to the view that USIA was only necessary because of the Soviets and since the Soviets were gone, the self-evidentiary nature of the US would handle whatever (plus whatever remnant of an international information program that remained). I'm simplifying, but that was the fundamental point.
I feel an “IO Range” like concept, which existed in DOD (don’t if it still does, or that is as relevant as the name suggests), is too advanced for State at this point. Staff levels would limit gaming opportunities. While Defence has enough personnel for training float, State barely gets by, not to mention that training isn’t rewarded in career paths at State while it’s mandatory at Defense.
That’s said, it’s an idea worth exploring. It does remind me of a quote akin to the “strategic corporal” from…1951:
“Sometimes policy is ‘made’ by the junior officer who writes an original memorandum. Sometimes it is made by an unexpected utterance at a top-level press conference. But the information consequences of policy ought always be taken into account, and the information man ought always to be consulted.”
Someday I'd like to learn more about why DOS doesn't like training the way DOD does. I have a private opinion that DOD may love the credentials too much but State seems passively hostile to the notion.
Simples! State doesn't train like the DOD because they have a small fraction of the budget and personnel. We 'Mercans put our money in things we trust. Guns. I say this as a former Strategic Communications Officer because it's true, not because I like it.
It is always bracing to check how few FSOs there are
Maggie is right. The training float — the excess staffing that allows people to be "pulled off the line" to train — doesn't exist at State. However, it's not just State's efforts, particularly informational efforts, aren't tangible like a tank, ship, or bomb. I've been in the discussions "but Defense builds systems in all states cuz... and that buys them more support" etc. Except DOS activities touch more states and localities, mostly exchanges but also trade and more. This is an especially important point at a time when fewer Americans actually know someone who has served. But, State's domestic outreach is inhibited by institutional practices of the last several decades. Go back to the 1950s, for example, and there was signficant domestic engagement, from in-person to over the air.
We can blame Congress, and not just because weapons systems are built inefficiently to buy votes. There's the argument that armed services committee members get more bang for their buck: they get to ride helicopters, go on ships, fly to cool places, see things explode, etc. The budget for a combatant commander to support a CODEL is a bit more than an ambassador or a regional bureau assistant secretary. The foreign affairs committee, namely in the House, does not have the same prestige as the armed services committee. Going back to 1946, for example, and the Rules Committee Chair said he didn't care if a the foreign affairs committee approved a bill, "it is a backwater" and he'd move on it when he and his committee wanted to. When I testified before HFAC, most of the Members' comments were directed at agencies other than State, mostly Defense, which I pointed out in my closing (which may not have been appreciated). For my part, I've testified several times before HASC, and only once before HFAC, each time on generally the same topic. One is more interested in the conversation than the other. At least SFRC confirms nominees.
We can also blame State. They rarely ask for money for staff. To be truthful, we need to bring OMB and the White House into this part of the conversation to know how often and how much the State Department wanted but the WH/OMB blocked. What we can see is HR at State disliked the bulge from Clinton's massive hiring and did what it could to trim back down rather than adapt. That process, from what I had been told over many years, was on State, not the WH/OMB.
We can also blame State for its relationship with Congress. In 2011, as the executive director of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, I compared the Congressional engagement between State and Defense with Congress. Walking down the hallway with the DOD offices and one say the double doors to the office open and a collegial inviting atmosphere nearly drawing you in. When I got to the State office, the single door was open, but inside was a dimly look maze of 6' cubicle walls in dark blue with dark blue walls. (Whether the room was actually dimly lit or not is arguable, but the dark colors sure made it feel that way.) There was no receptionist and the open cubicle that opened to the door, presumably the person tasked as a greeter, was clearly on a personal call. She continued as as I stood there waiting for her to finish. After finally getting off, I asked who was in charge. They weren't there. Could you give them my card. Sure. And I left and never heard a word. At the time, I was often told by many in the department and on the Hill that my relations with Members and staff was more extensive than the institution's. Whether true or not, there's no way that would have been uttered if the conversation was about Defense and not State.
Lastly, more than one Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has asked for more money for State. SecDef Gates is known for doing the same. One CJCS, before he took the Chief role and when he was the Chief of Naval Operations, even offered some of his budget to State.
There is fault to go around.
On the staffing levels, this doesn't just manifest as a lack of training opportunities and the failure to encourage training (as an institution, individuals may have different experiences if at the right place at the right time working for the right person). It means less interagency integration. I'd have to look back at my notes, but I think it was at the Command and General Staff College at Ft Leavenworth where they had two billets open for State Department personnel. These billets were two-way: the college would back-fill the State personnel with Army officers at no cost to State (I think CGCS was even going to reimburse State for the personnel coming to them on TDY). They couldn't fill the billets. Another example was a large strategic communication conference filled with personnel across DOD and across the interagency. The lone State Department rep there, as I pointed out from the podium during my presentation that touched on this, was a Lt Col. (Later in the conference, held in San Antonio, a subordinate of the Under Secretary for PD/PA came for a half-day and left.) At another conference, this one at SPAWAR in San Diego, I pointed out during Q&A after my presentation that the lone State Department person in the room was there because they were detailed to Air University, and it was Air U that permitted her to attend this week-long event, not State.
There are knock-on effects that I don't see getting much air. Some of this I reviewed with the manager of the last State Department QDDR. He was well-aware of the issues and had far greater depth of knowledge. The final QDDR had nothing about this, which I figure meant it was watered down and removed because that manager, now a sitting Member of Congress, truly got it.
The talk about a Goldwater-Nichols for State is long gone, at least I don't hear about that anymore. There are no champions for State on the Hill with the heft or will to psuh for the necessary changes from their side.
Things will happen when the top leadership decide they want change.
Another Illuminating post! Lately I’ve wondered whether wargaming could be used to analyze narrative warfare matters. Efforts are lacking in trying to develop methods and scenarios for gaming story-wars.
I see that a Robert Domaingue, right after retiring from the U.S. State Department, where he’d been the lead Conflict Game Designer in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, called on State to create its own Office of Diplomatic Gaming, in article titled article on “Why the State Department Needs an Office of Diplomatic Gaming” (2022). It verges on calling for story-war gaming.
I’ve also found that the UK’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) has issued an Influence Wargaming Handbook (2023) — the first of its kind. The handbook claims that “wargaming is particularly suited to exploring and representing influence” (p. vi) — but it is sensibly cautious about the conceptual and methodological challenges that lie ahead for wargaming influence.
Wargaming might be a good path to go down in order to call for improved attention to information etc. matters that keep being neglected.
Great points as ever — so frustrating that the R post is reduced to an acting undersecretary once again. Imagine if the Navy was treated this way…